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the differences oftreatment should be
"respected by limiting protection where
the text contains a limit and leaving
textually unlimited protection just
where the Congress apparently chose
to leave it." Id. at 575.
This decision had immediate ramifications in Maryland because it implicitly affirmed the fourth circuit's
holding in Kolkhorst v. Tilghman, 897
F.2d 1282, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865
(1992). In that case, the fourth circuit
held that the Baltimore City Police
Department could not limit the number
of police officers, other than new hires,
who are allowed to join active military
reserve units. In so doing, the fourth
circuit construed section 2024( d), as
the Supreme Court did in King, as
placing no limit on reservists covered
under the section.
With the decreasing need for a fully
staffed and active military in modem
political climates, this decision also
has major implications for military
policy. It ensures a fully trained and
prepared defense structure while enabling cuts in military spending. This
would increase the amount of money
which would be available to the private
sector for things such as loans for small
businesses. The burdens placed on
employers by the Act could, therefore,
be compensated by more government
spending in the private sector.

- Shawn Gritz
Presley v. Etowah County Commiss~n:
ONLY PROCEDURAL
CHANGES DIRECTLY RELATED TO VOTING AND ELECTION PROCESSES MAY OFFEND
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT.
After consolidating two Alabama
cases, the United States Supreme Court
held that changes in an elected official's
authority did not require preclearance
under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S. C.
§ 1973c (1975). In Presley v. Etowah
County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820
(1992), the Court ruled that such a
change must be directly related to vot-

ing and the election process in order to
come within the Act's province.
Before engaging in its analysis, the
Court ventured into the history and
pertinent parts of the Voting Rights
Act (" Act"). The Act was created to
remove race discrimination from voting. Section 5 of the Act requires that
any changes in voting procedure with
respect to "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" must receive administrative or judicial preclearance.
The Act defines voting to include "all
action necessary to make a vote effective." For the purpose of evaluating
changes made to a covered district's
voting practices, the Act states that
such changes should be compared
against the practices that were in use in
that jurisdiction on November 1, 1964.
When the Act was created, Etowah
County in Alabama employed the
Etowah County Commission ("Etowah
Commission") to oversee the maintenance, repair, and construction of the
county roads. The county was divided
into four districts. A five-member
commission was elected at large under
a residency district system. Four members would each receive an allotment
of funds for discretionary spending on
the roads in their respective districts.
The Etowah Commission voted as a
collective body to determine the initial
allotments each of the four members
would receive. The fifth member was
the chairman who oversaw the solid
waste authority, prepared the budget,
and managed the courthouse buildings
and grounds.
In 1986, the Etowah Commission
was restructured and increased to six
members, with each member elected
by the voters in a specific district. Four
members ofthe new commission were
holdovers from the previous commission. The newly-formed fifth district,
which was designed to create a black
majority district, elected a black man,
Lawrence Presley. A black citizen had
not previously held a seat on the Etowah
Commission in the modem era. Shortly
after the new members took office, the

Etowah Commission passed the "Common Fund Resolution." This resolution effectively removed the individual
authority from the commissioners.
Instead of allocating monies to each
commissioner, road funds were to be
kept in common accounts. This allowed a simple majority, such as the
holdover members, to decide how to
spend the funds.
In the companion case from Russell
County, Alabama, the Russell County
Commission ("Russell Commission")
originally comprised three commissioners elected at large. The commissioners were responsible for the road
shops, crew, and equipment, as well as
routine road maintenance, in their respective districts. After one of the
commissioners was indicted for corruption, the Russell Commission
adopted the "Unit System" which relegated control over road construction
to a County Engineer appointed by the
Commission. The Unit System was
not submitted for preclearance under
section 5 of the Act.
The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
issued a consent decree in 1985 which
increased the Russell Commission to
seven members and changed the election system to district-by-district voting. The Department of Justice
precleared the decree, but did not mention the Unit System, which effectively denied the commissioners control of the road funds and equipment.
Ed Mack and Nathaniel Gosha were
elected to the new seats and became the
first black commissioners in modem
times.
The appellants, Presley, Mack, and
Gosha, filed a single complaint in district court which alleged thatthe county
commissions had violated section 5 of
the Act by not obtaining preclearance
for either the Common Fund Resolution orthe Unit System. A three-judge
panel convened by the district court
found that neither the Common Fund
Resolution nor the Unit System required preclearance under the Act.
In reviewing the history of case law
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on the Act, the Supreme Court restated
that the Act was constitutional and that
it required a broad interpretation to
protect citizens' equal enjoyment of
the right to vote. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at
827. Further, the Court noted that the
Act was aimed to protect citizens from
subtle, as well as obvious, state efforts
to deny the right to vote. Id.
The Court made clear that the initial step in analyzing claims under section 5 was to determine whether, or
not, the changes altered the election
law. Id. at 828. The Court found four
basic typologies indicative, though not
exhaustive, of section 5 claims. Id.
Those typologies involved changes affecting the manner of voting, the candidacy requirements and qualifications,
the composition of the electorate, or
the creation or abolition ofan elective
office. Id. As a general rule, the Court
said that a change must have "a direct
relation to voting and the election process." Id. at 829.
The appellants, joined by a brieffor
the United States as amicus curie, argued that the Common Fund Resolution fell within the Act's coverage because the value of each vote had been
diminished. Id. They reasoned that the
value of each vote decreased because
the authority of each commissioner
decreased. Id. Thus, the redistricting
system designed to ensure black representation became a token gesture.
The Court, however, defined voting power as being dependant upon
increases or decreases in the number of
officials, not in the individual power
an official holds while in office. Id.
The Court opined that without drawing
a restrained line between governmental decisions affecting voting and those
that do not, section 5 would become an
omnipotent statute applicable to virtually all facets ofgovernmental activity.
Id.
As to the Unit System, the Court
found that delegating authority to an
appointed official was possibly analogous to the replacement of an elected
official with an appointed one. Id. at
830. Nevertheless, the Court held that
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reallocations of authority within government could not constitute voting
changes. Id. Furthermore, the Court
stated that intraconstituency and
interconstituency changes in authority
may have affected voters, but neither
case presented a change in voting for
purposes of the Act. Id. at 831.
The Court also recognized that the
Attorney General's administrative interpretation deserved considerable deference, but noted that "[d]eference does
not mean acquiescence." Id. The
Court determined that Congress unambiguously stated that section 5 only
covered changes in the rules governing
voting. Id. at 833. As such, the Court
found the Attorney General's position
contrary to the Act and, therefore, not
entitled to a high degree of deference.
Id.
The Court affirmed the decision of
the district court but supplanted their
own standard that a change must directly relate to the voting process to
offend section 5. By making federal
law more predictable to the states, the
Court sought to enforce federalism as a
''practical system of governance and
not a mere poetic ideal." Id.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices White and Blackmun,
pointed to the definition of "voting"
given in the Act which includes "all
action necessary to make a vote effective." Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
Justice Stevens coupled this expansive
language to the historical deprivation
ofthe right to vote and created a litmus
test for deciding whether section 5
would apply. He concluded that whenever significant changes toward the
disposition ofpower were made after a
black person had assumed a position of
power not historically held, those
changes should be held suspect. Id. at
838.
It is likely that the Court will use
cases such as these as mechanisms to
federal restraint. By restrictively defining key terms, the Supreme Court
can severely curtail the social effects of
federal legislation. The Voting Rights
Act provided a system of quick review

of suspect changes in power. Such
claims may now be forced through the
more expensive and circuitous court
system.
- Brett R. Wilson
County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes andBands ofthe Yakima Indian
Nation: THE INDIAN GENERAL

ALLOTMENT ACT PERMITS
COUNTIES TO IMPOSE AD VALOREM TAXES BUT NOT EXCISE TAXES ON PATENTED
LAND OWNED BY TRIBES AND
TRIBE MEMBERS.
In an opinion delivered by Justice
Scalia, the Supreme Court in County of
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683 (1992), upheld and remanded
the decision ofthe Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals holding that the Indian
General Allotment Act ("Act"), permits a county to impose an ad valorem
tax upon land patented in fee, but does
not permit a county to impose an excise tax upon the sale of such land.
After reviewing land allotment to Indian tribes since the seventeen hundreds to establish the purpose of the
Act and how Congress intended it to
affect the Indian nations, the Court
concluded the Act was not implicitly
repealed by subsequent acts of Congress.
This case involved approximately
1.3 million acres of land, mostly in
Yakima County, of which eighty percent was held in trust by the United
States. The remaining twenty percent
was held in fee patent by Indians and
non-Indians. Most ofthe property was
located in Yakima County, Washington. Yakima County ("the County")
imposed an ad valorem levy on taxable
real property and an excise tax upon
the sale of the land held in fee patent.
When Yakima IndianNation, ("Yakima
Nation"), the owners, refused to pay
these taxes, the County attempted to
foreclose on their property.
Yakima Nation sought injunctive
and declaratory relief in the Federal
District Court for Washington State on

